GREEN CLIMATE FUND | Independent Evaluation Unit

EMERGING FINDINGS BRIEF

Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme

Independent Synthesis by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit

November 2026

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I. BACKGROUND

1. INTRODUCTION

The Green Climate Fund's (GCF) Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) has evolved since its establishment in 2014. Initially conceived as a mechanism for strengthening country capacity to engage with the GCF, the RPSP has progressively expanded and adapted in response to changing institutional priorities, country needs, Board decisions, and evaluative findings. Across successive phases, RPSP has been expected to support national designated authorities (NDAs) and focal points, strengthen country programming, enable direct access, improve climate finance coordination, support adaptation planning, and contribute to project pipeline development.

Adoption of the Readiness Strategy 2024-2027 marks a significant moment in its evolution. The Strategy narrows and reorganises RPSP objectives, introduces country and direct access entity (DAE) windows, strengthens links to climate programming and pipeline development, commits to simplifying and streamlining the Readiness Results Management Framework (RRMF), and introduces new modalities such as the GCF Liaison Officer placement scheme, all in the broader context of GCF's renewed and enhanced support for Country Platforms. These reforms respond to several issues identified in earlier IEU evaluations of RPSP, including the need for a clearer RPSP value proposition, stronger country ownership, more differentiated access, improved direct access support, clearer links to pipeline development, and better results evidence.

The Independent Synthesis of the Green Climate Fund's (GCF's) Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (hereafter, the RPSP Synthesis) is part of the Independent Evaluation Unit's (IEU) 2026 work plan. This brief is part of the IEU's Independent Synthesis of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme. It does not re-evaluate the RPSP or systematically review all evidence on RPSP support. It offers initial observations on the RPSP's evolution and on Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, organised around the four areas of the Synthesis:

- *Strategic Positioning: RPSP as an Evolving Instrument*
- *Access, Use and Contribution to Impact Stories*
- *Delivery and Operationalisation*
- *Results and Impact Reporting Architecture*

2. METHOD AND EVIDENCE BASE

This brief draws on a targeted review and analytic synthesis of evaluative and strategic evidence on the evolution of the RPSP, including emerging findings from the ongoing Third Performance Review of the GCF (TPR). It also draws on inception interviews with GCF Secretariat staff.

The review focused first on core RPSP evidence, specifically the 2018 and 2023 IEU evaluations of the RPSP, the Readiness Strategy 2024-2027, related Board documentation, and the revised Readiness Results Management Framework (RRMF). These sources were used to trace the RPSP's development over time, including how the IEU has assessed it, what recommendations were made, and how the current Strategy and results architecture align with earlier evaluation findings.

The review drew selectively on recently concluded IEU evaluations and syntheses that speak directly to RPSP's current positioning, including evidence on direct access, country ownership, and the Project Preparation Facility (PPF). These sources were not reviewed as standalone evaluations in their entirety. Rather, they were used to test and elaborate themes that emerged from the RPSP evidence, including direct access capacity, country ownership, pipeline development, RPSP-PPF complementarity, differentiated access, institutional capacity, and results management. The review also considered selected comparator evidence from other readiness and capacity building initiatives to identify broader lessons relevant to the future positioning of RPSP.

Finally, the review drew on emerging findings and analysis from the GCF's Third Performance Review (TPR). The TPR is a Fund-wide review whose evaluation questions and data collection run in parallel with those of the Synthesis. Although the two exercises are administratively separate, close exchange between the teams allows the RPSP Synthesis to draw on the TPR's broader data and insights and place its own findings within the GCF's broader architecture. The Synthesis also builds on data already collected and analysed by the TPR, avoiding duplication and making both exercises more efficient. In particular, it draws on the TPR Summary Report submitted to the Board at B.46, the TPR Synthesis Study,[1] and a set of analytical products and datasets developed for the TPR. These comprise the country visits,[2] the RPSP-

[1] Document GCF/B.45/Inf.08 titled "A Synthesis Study on the Green Climate Fund: An Interim Deliverable under the Third Performance Review", 8 June 2026.
[2] Country visits were conducted in Brazil, Ghana, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nepal, Saint Lucia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

related quantitative and LLM-assisted qualitative analyses, the Accredited Entity Perception Survey, a targeted review of TPR interviews and a qualitative review of previous IEU evaluations and case studies.[3]

The analysis has focused on drawing out relevant emerging findings from the TPR, providing a preliminary state of knowledge, and identifying data gaps to further guide the design of the Synthesis and related data collection. As the TPR remains ongoing, along with the RPSP Synthesis itself, findings presented here should be considered as preliminary observations, likely to evolve as analysis continues.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE NOTE

The final report of the Synthesis will be submitted to the Board at its forty-seventh meeting (B.47). The Synthesis has a developmental purpose, in that it is being undertaken while the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 is still in its early years of implementation and as discussions on the next Readiness Strategy get underway. It therefore aims to support learning as implementation unfolds rather than only to assess performance after the fact. This brief supports that purpose by sharing emerging findings early.

At the time of writing, primary data collection for the RPSP Synthesis, including key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and a perception survey, was still underway and will inform the final report, which is why this brief does not yet contain conclusions or recommendations. Therefore, the findings presented here are preliminary and will be tested and refined as data collection and analysis continue, so they should not be regarded as the final position of the Synthesis. The brief uses GCF terminology and acronyms and assumes some familiarity with the Fund.

[3] This review covered the following IEU evaluations: the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (2023), the Independent Evaluation of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the GCF's Investments in the Latin American and Caribbean States (2024), the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Energy Sector Portfolio and Approach (2024), the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to Indigenous Peoples (2025), the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to Country Ownership (2025), the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Result Area "Health and Well-Being, and Food and Water Security" (2025) and the Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to and Portfolio of Climate Information and Early Warning System Interventions (2026).

II. EMERGING FINDINGS

3. Strategic Positioning: RPSP as an Evolving Instrument

Origins and positioning

Launched in 2014, the RPSP is the GCF's primary instrument for supporting developing countries in the planning, access, programming and use of climate finance. Its mandate, which is rooted in the GCF Governing Instrument (2011) and was operationalised by the Board through decision B.08/11, focuses on strengthening institutional capacities, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming frameworks. The RPSP is also the largest and most comprehensive readiness initiative among peer programmes globally, with cumulative approvals reaching USD 787.7 million across 906 readiness requests in 142 countries as of 31 August 2026.[4]

The RPSP has evolved through three strategic phases, separated by a transition period, as set out in Table 1. Readiness 1.0 (2014–2018) established the programme and shaped its early operation. Readiness 2.0 (2019–2023) gave it a more formal footing through a dedicated Strategy, Theory of Change (ToC) and results framework, alongside a stronger emphasis on partnerships and knowledge management. The IEU evaluated these two phases, referred to in this brief as legacy readiness, in 2018 and 2023. A transition period, known as Readiness 2.5, followed from April 2024 to May 2025, during which the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 was in effect but grants continued to be approved using Readiness 2.0 templates. Readiness 3.0, operational since June 2025, introduces country and DAE windows, the GCF Liaison Officer scheme, Country Platforms, a revised RRMF and multi-year programming.

Table 1: Main features of Readiness 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0

Phase	Period	Major developments
Readiness 1.0	2014-2018	Establishment of the RPSP, with a focus on NDA strengthening, accreditation support, country programming and adaptation planning.
Readiness 2.0	2019–2023 (Strategy 2019–2021, extended to the end of 2023)	Introduction of a formal Strategy, ToC and results framework, with a stronger emphasis on partnerships and knowledge management.
Readiness 2.5 (Transition period)	April 2024 – May 2025	Continued use of Readiness 2.0 procedures and templates, although the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 was in effect.

[4] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraph 1. Figures cover all readiness support approved since the programme's inception, including under Readiness 1.0, Readiness 2.0, the transition period and Readiness 3.0, and reflect approved funding, not disbursements. They comprise 825 country readiness grants (USD 766.8 million), 33 DAE grants (USD 18.5 million) and 48 technical assistance interventions (USD 2.4 million). Secretariat figures presented in October 2026 put the total at USD 793 million across 912 requests as of 1 October 2026.

PHASE	PERIOD	MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
Readiness 3.0	June 2025 – 2027 (Strategy 2024–2027)	Introduction of country and DAE windows, the GCF Liaison Officer scheme, Country Platforms, a revised RRMF and multi-year programming.

Across these phases, the RPSP's mandate has remained broadly consistent in its orientation towards NDA strengthening, direct access, country programming, adaptation planning and pipeline development. Each strategic phase has nonetheless adjusted the programme's objectives, modalities, and results expectations in response to changing country needs, implementation experience, institutional priorities, and evaluative learning. The most significant of these adjustments are examined below.

A recurring value proposition challenge

From its early phases, RPSP carried a broad mandate rooted in the GCF Governing Instrument and successive Board decisions. Board decision B.05/14 positioned RPSP support as a mechanism for promoting country ownership and access to funding, including support for country programmes, in-country institutional capacities, NDA/focal point functions, multi-stakeholder consultation, and entities' ability to meet standards for direct access. Board decision B.08/11 operationalised the RPSP, confirming access for all developing countries and establishing an allocation floor for SIDS, LDCs, and African States. Subsequent Board decisions, including B.11/04 and B.13/32, reinforced expectations around timely disbursement, simplified access, country programming, institutional strengthening, and pipeline development.[5]

This early mandate positioned RPSP as more than a simple capacity-building facility. It was expected to help countries organise their engagement with the GCF, strengthen national institutions, enable coordination and consultation, support country programming, and facilitate direct access. As the RPSP evolved, these functions became increasingly linked to wider expectations around climate finance access, project pipeline development, complementarity with other GCF instruments, and country-led planning. The 2018 IEU evaluation already described RPSP as evolving from a narrower remit into a broader instrument supporting country-driven pipelines of transformational projects, while later IEU evidence on country ownership and

[5] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 1, October 2018.

PPF further underscores the links among readiness, national planning, direct access, pipeline foresight, and project preparation.[6,7,8]

The 2018 RPSP evaluation by the IEU characterised this evolution as appropriate overall, but emphasised the need for clearer strategic choices, including a defined vision, strategy, niche, targets, expected results, and comparative advantage. In particular, the evaluation asked what "readiness" meant for the GCF, whether the RPSP was preparing countries for GCF finance or climate finance more broadly, and how the GCF would know when a country was "ready".[9] The 2023 RPSP evaluation returned to a similar issue. It found that the RPSP was "the key GCF programme designed to meet the climate finance needs of developing countries", but that, as a "work in progress", its value proposition was still insufficiently developed, not universally shared within the GCF and among stakeholders. The evaluation also found that the RPSP's role in the global climate finance architecture was insufficiently articulated. On whether the RPSP was preparing countries for GCF finance or for climate finance more broadly, the 2023 evaluation pointed towards climate finance more broadly, while keeping GCF investment in view. It recommended that the RPSP "should be understood as playing an enabling role in building national climate finance ecosystems", and that it supports national policies, strategies, plans and programmes "to guide GCF investments, and in complementarity with other climate finance sources". It also recommended clarifying the RPSP's value proposition and business case, and anchoring its role within the Fund's strategic directions and modalities, including the PPF, Private Sector Facility (PSF), accreditation, and other instruments.[10]

This value proposition "challenge" therefore hinged on how the RPSP was specified, strategically and operationally. The RPSP was expected to serve several aims at once. These spanned its formal objectives under RPSP 2.0 (capacity-building for climate finance coordination, strategies for climate finance implementation, adaptation planning, paradigm-shifting pipeline development, and knowledge sharing and learning) as well as broader principles it was meant to advance, such as country ownership, direct access and complementarity with other funds' readiness support. However, the relationships among these aims were not always sufficiently prioritised, sequenced, operationalised or evidenced, and it was not specified how progress on one would lead to progress on another.[11]

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[6] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 1, October 2018.
[7] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to Country Ownership*. Evaluation report No. 24, September 2025.
[8] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's Project Preparation Facility: Final report*, 2026.
[9] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 1, October 2018.
[10] Independent Evaluation Unit. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme,* Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, conclusion 1 and recommendations 1.1, 6.1 and 6.2.
[11] Ibid., conclusion 6 and 7, and recommendations 1.1 and 2.3.

This lack of specificity made it difficult to articulate the RPSP's strategic orientation relative to other GCF instruments and to demonstrate its overall contribution.

What Readiness 3.0 addresses and reframes

Readiness 3.0 can be understood as an effort to translate RPSP's broad and evolving mandate into a more structured operating model. Following the USP-2 intentions of predictability, speed, simplicity, complementarity, volume and direct access, the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 streamlines the RPSP from five to three objectives: i) effective climate finance coordination and sequencing for climate investment planning and execution; ii) paradigm-shifting pipeline development and implementation; and iii) knowledge sharing and learning.[12] Its vision emphasises strengthened programming capacities, enabling environments, investment planning, and enhanced access to GCF resources through a focus on climate programming and direct access.[13]

The Readiness Strategy and programme design respond to issues identified in the 2018 and 2023 RPSP evaluations by the IEU. By design, Readiness 3.0 addresses the value proposition issue by narrowing the RPSP architecture and linking readiness more directly to country programming, direct access, pipeline development and results. A major feature of this reframing is a shift toward longer-term, more differentiated modalities and a rebalancing of readiness resources across objectives.[14]

The Strategy introduces two streamlined modalities, operationally known as the country and DAE windows. Under the country support modality, NDAs or focal points can access up to USD 4 million per country over four years, covering all three objectives. Under the DAE support modality, DAEs can access up to USD 1 million per entity over four years, through a differentiated approach that caters for entities with greater capacity gaps.[15] The Strategy also retains the Board-mandated aim of a floor of 50 per cent of readiness support for particularly vulnerable countries, including the SIDS, LDCs and African States.[16] These measures respond to longstanding concerns that broad access to RPSP resources has not always translated into equitable or effective use, especially for countries and entities with more limited institutional capacity.[17]

[12] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraph 14.
[13] Ibid., paragraph 13.
[14] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraphs 14 and 22.
[15] Ibid., paragraphs 22–24.
[16] Ibid., paragraph 26; decision B.08/11.
[17] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, recommendations 7 and 7.1.

The Strategy also shifts programming emphasis. Pipeline development received only 8 per cent of readiness resources spent on completed grants between 2014 and April 2023;[18] the new Strategy targets 60 per cent of the readiness portfolio for pipeline development and implementation to build the programming base for USP-2 targeted results.[19] It also attributes fragmentation, gaps in coherence, and duplicative application and approval processes to the previous objective structure, in which a separate objective for NAP development overlapped with the other four.[20] The consolidation of objectives noted above is therefore intended not only to increase emphasis on pipeline development but also to address the fragmentation created by a separate NAP objective.

While much of its design is framed around GCF programming and USP-2 targeted results, Objective 1 of the Readiness Strategy extends investment planning to "a broad spectrum of private and public, international and national climate finance resources".[21] The Strategy also committed the Secretariat to revising its operational guidance and results management framework.[22] The revised operational guidance and the RRMF Handbook, both dated June 2026, carry this duality forward: the revised RRMF tracks submissions to "the GCF or other climate funds", and the guidance states that readiness funds "can be leveraged to enhance country programming beyond the Green Climate Fund".[23]

The same broader orientation appears in the Partnerships and Access Strategy (PAS), which the Board noted at its thirty-ninth meeting. The PAS places readiness within the wider GCF access agenda and sets out how the Secretariat would deliver the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, adopted the previous year.[24] It describes the RPSP as "a powerful, unique access tool for the climate finance architecture, supporting GCF programming as well as wider efforts to build institutional platforms and enabling environments for climate investment beyond GCF". It also finds that the RPSP's effectiveness as an access tool has been limited by a model relying too heavily on delivery partners for readiness design, with support delivered largely on a fly-in-fly-out basis that "fails to grow lasting in-country capacity".[25] In response, the PAS proposes technical partnerships with pre-qualified providers, a placement modality for capacity-constrained countries, and an incubation pathway for candidate direct access entities.[26] Corresponding features are now

[18] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraph 7 and table 1.
[19] Ibid., paragraphs 9 and 14(b).
[20] Ibid., paragraph 10.
[21] Ibid., paragraph 16.
[22] Ibid., paragraph 29.
[23] Green Climate Fund, *Guidance on Standardized Readiness Deliverables*, June 2026; Green Climate Fund, *Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook*, June 2026, objective 2 outcome indicators.
[24] Decision B.39/14, paragraph (c); document GCF/B.39/18/Rev.01 titled "Partnerships and Access Strategy", 11 July 2024.
[25] Document GCF/B.39/18/Rev.01, annex II, paragraph 17.
[26] Ibid., annex II, paragraph 19.

part of the Readiness 3.0 design: a roster of pre-qualified delivery partners, the GCF Liaison Officer scheme, and a dedicated DAE window giving direct access entities their own route into readiness support.[27]

Taken together, the changes outlined here point to a shift in how Readiness 3.0 is intended to operate and, more fundamentally, in how the RPSP itself is structured. Earlier approaches supported a relatively broad range of readiness activities without always specifying clearly how those activities should relate to one another or lead to stronger climate finance outcomes. Readiness 3.0 seeks to connect them more clearly, within the wider climate finance context described above. The question for this Synthesis is whether this more structured programme design is beginning to change the operating conditions that have historically shaped RPSP performance. The remainder of this section considers how firmly Readiness 3.0 is anchored in the GCF's wider strategic architecture and how consistently it is understood. Sections 4 to 6 then summarise what is currently known about how readiness support is being used and delivered, and how its results are reported.

Readiness 3.0: emergent patterns in strategic positioning under USP-2

Alignment

The alignment of Readiness 3.0 with the 2023 IEU evaluation's recommendations is most evident through its formal anchoring within USP-2, which lists readiness first among its programming priorities. Readiness programme management, which the 2023 evaluation found straddled multiple divisions, particularly the Division of Country Programming and the Division of Portfolio Management, now rests mainly with a dedicated team within the Department of Investment Services (DINVS), with the Department of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (DMEL) supporting readiness data, the RRMF and monitoring. This is consistent with the evaluation's call for formal, strategic programme leadership.[28] At the same time, portfolio management, including approval of proposals, disbursements, and delivery partner engagement, has been decentralised to four regional departments created in September 2024 (see Section 5).[29] The Readiness Strategy's first year of implementation coincided with the Secretariat's institutional restructuring in 2024, which reportedly improved country engagement but slowed the finalisation of operational modalities.[30] The evaluation's call for a country-centred approach is reflected in the design features

[27] Green Climate Fund, "Partnering for Readiness", webpage, https://www.greenclimate.fund/access-funding/readiness-preparatory-support/partnering-for-readiness (accessed 15 October 2026); Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraph 31.
[28] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, recommendation 1.2.
[29] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraph 30.
[30] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraph 72.

described above, as well as in a dedicated knowledge-sharing and learning objective and a joint DAE community of practice with the Adaptation Fund.[31]

Results management and learning

In response to the 2018 evaluation, the GCF developed dedicated knowledge management and results-tracking functions for the RPSP. When the 2023 evaluation took stock, it found it was still too soon to see their added value.[32] Three years on, that value has yet to be demonstrated, though for different reasons in each case. On knowledge management, the Readiness Knowledge Bank, launched in May 2023, now sits alongside a separate Project Knowledge Bank and an updated Open Data Library. At the time of writing, however, the Readiness Knowledge Bank did not appear to have been updated recently.[33]

On results measurement, while the revised RRMF was finalised in 2024, its Handbook was issued only in June 2026, and the Secretariat's latest annual report on readiness presents no results yet from grants approved under the new modalities. The same report notes that the move from the legacy to the revised RRMF created challenges in data collection, aggregation and analysis, so it is too early to judge the framework's value as a portfolio management tool (see Section 6).[34]

The RRMF links RPSP programming to the Readiness Strategy's own objectives, as well as to targeted results under USP-2 and core indicators under its Integrated Results Management Framework (IRMF). This alignment also runs through the Secretariat's own multi-year work planning. By 2027, the Secretariat aims to have worked with over 100 countries to agree on shared programming priorities and promote the uptake of targeted readiness support, in line with USP-2 Target 1. It presents its work on country and regional platforms as part of this effort. Guided by Target 2, doubling the number of DAEs with approved funding proposals, it is promoting uptake of the DAE readiness window, aiming to help more than 60 DAEs build readiness and to secure at least 25 new DAE funding proposal approvals by 2027.[35]

[31] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraph 14(c); Green Climate Fund, Strategic Plan for the Green Climate Fund 2024–2027, section 4.1(b).
[32] Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, executive summary.
[33] Green Climate Fund, "GCF Readiness Knowledge Bank launched", news item, 15 May 2023; Green Climate Fund, Readiness Knowledge Bank, https://knowledge.greenclimate.fund/readiness/about (accessed 11 November 2026).
[34] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraphs 11 and 32; Green Climate Fund, Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook, June 2026; Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraphs 10 and 100. Only five proposals had been approved under the new modalities by the end of 2025.
[35] Document GCF/B.43/17 titled "Work programme of the Secretariat for 2026-2028 and administrative budget", 10 October 2025, annex II, paragraphs 10 and 12–14.

Strategic ambition in programming design

Signals of the Strategy's ambition to strengthen access to climate finance beyond the GCF are evident at the country and entity level. Readiness has directly enabled engagement with other funds' financing, while also strengthening entities' broader market positioning. Country Platforms are being promoted to extend engagement to national financial institutions, industry associations, and other intermediaries better placed to mobilise private-sector participation. Country examples illustrate how this ambition is being pursued, although several predate Readiness 3.0. In Nepal, NIMB became the country's first private-sector DAE on its accreditation in 2024, and has benefited from capacity-building workshops delivered under a readiness grant implemented by the Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC), itself a national DAE.[36] In Brazil, readiness support has strengthened the secretariat of the Brazil Climate and Ecological Transformation Investment Platform (BIP), a Country Platform designed to mobilise private investment at a larger scale than the GCF-supported public programming guided by the Country Programme. With GCF financing volumes modest compared with those of larger development banks, stakeholders see the GCF's value in a catalytic role, including potentially in de-risking structures associated with the BIP, although that role remains under discussion.[37] In Saint Lucia, the NDA has used readiness allocations to develop sectoral pipelines with both the GCF and other financiers.[38]

The ambition to raise pipeline development to 60 per cent of the readiness portfolio also depends on how readiness connects to the PPF, which provides financial and technical support, through grants and equity, to develop high-quality funding proposals for submission to the GCF.[39] The Readiness Strategy envisages a concept note-to-funding-proposal continuum with the PPF[40], though how that continuum should actually function has long remained an open question. The 2023 RPSP evaluation had already pointed to the discord between RPSP and PPF support.[41] The two were adopted together under the B.37 reforms, with a boundary set out on paper under which readiness supports preparatory work up to, but not including, full funding proposal preparation. In practice, the two overlap significantly, with both able to fund the same preparatory activities (feasibility studies, stakeholder consultations, financial structuring), such that the boundary

[36] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Brief: Nepal, 21 May 2026, sections C and D (not published).*
[37] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Brief: Brazil, 26 May 2026, sections B and F (not published)*.
[38] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Brief: Saint Lucia, 22 December 2025 (not published)*.
[39] Green Climate Fund, "Project Preparation Facility", webpage, accessed 8 October 2026, https://www.greenclimate.fund/access-funding/project-preparation-facility.
[40] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraph 17.
[41] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, conclusion 2.

depends more on a concept's maturity than on any real functional distinction. No mechanism preserves technical support or institutional knowledge across the handoff, a design gap compared with peer funds that retain continuity across their own preparation cycles. The 2026 IEU evaluation of the PPF addresses this directly, recommending that the Secretariat build genuine coherence between the two instruments, creating synergies based on priorities and gaps identified in country programming, and considering concrete mechanisms to preserve continuity and institutional knowledge across the readiness-to-preparation handoff, such as an integrated operational framework or a structured coordination mechanism. The PPF evaluation also notes that the design phase for the GCF's third strategic period offers the Board a timely opportunity to articulate how the PPF, the RPSP, and related modalities should be sequenced and deployed as a coherent support system for 2028–2031.[42]

The design-implementation gap

While the strategic intent behind the current Readiness Strategy is broadly shared across the Secretariat, NDAs and country-level stakeholders, views diverge on how that intent is being operationalised and communicated, and at times even on the meaning of basic terms. Country Platforms offer a telling example: stakeholders consulted during the TPR country visits described the concept as lacking a clear, specific definition, leaving it open to differing interpretations across stakeholders and countries, including on the role the GCF itself plays in supporting such platforms. In some countries, platforms were also seen as being driven by external partners, and their added value over existing coordination structures remained unclear.[43] A separate gap concerns the Liaison Officer role, where country stakeholders reported that the mandate had not always been clearly communicated at country level and where questions remain over the authority delegated to officers and the lines of accountability and supervision under which they work.[44]

Although this section considers the two together, they are distinct instruments that serve different purposes. Country Platforms are voluntary, government-led coordination mechanisms, and countries may choose to rely on their existing coordination structures instead. Liaison Officers, by contrast, are individual placements within the NDA who support it across a much wider range of needs, including programming, accreditation, readiness support and project preparation.[45] What they have in common is that both are new to the GCF, with the Secretariat still describing platforms as pilots in October 2025 and the terms of

[42] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's Project Preparation Facility: Final report, 2026*, paragraphs 203, 207 and 213-215.
[43] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Briefs: Tanzania, Nepal and Saint Lucia* (not published).
[44] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Briefs: Nepal and Mauritania* (not published).
[45] Green Climate Fund, Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook, June 2026, output indicator 1.1.2.1 and footnotes 4 and 12; Green Climate Fund, Standard Terms of Reference for Green Climate Fund Placements, Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme: Operational Modalities for the 2024-2027 Strategy, 30 October 2025, section II.

reference for the Liaison Officer scheme having been first finalised only in 2024.[46] Given how recently both were introduced, some early ambiguity in how each is understood and operated is to be expected, and it may well ease as countries, officers and the Secretariat gain experience with them. Interest in both is nonetheless evident, with strong demand for Liaison Officers and several countries being supported to develop Country Platforms. However, others have preferred to build on the coordination structures they already have (see Sections 4 and 5).

Table 2 sets out the operating conditions examined in Sections 4 to 6. A technical problem can often be fixed through a new procedure or template. In contrast, an operating condition is structural, rooted in the institutional arrangements, capacities, incentives, relationships and evidence systems that determine whether such fixes work in practice. The table distinguishes between the surface problems identified in prior evidence, the deeper operating conditions associated with these problems, the Readiness 3.0 response, and what remains under-evidenced.

Table 2: Recurring operating conditions and Readiness 3.0 responses

OPERATING CONDITION	SURFACE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN PRIOR EVIDENCE	DEEPER OPERATING CONDITION	READINESS 3.0 RESPONSE	WHAT REMAINS UNDER-EVIDENCED
Implementation	Delays, procedural complexity, unclear roles, coordination burdens	Delivery depends on multiple systems, actors, processes, and Secretariat/regional arrangements that need to work together predictably	Revised readiness guidebook, templates, GCF Partners Portal (GPP), new modalities including the Liaison Officer placement scheme, and Secretariat/regional arrangements	Whether reforms reduce complexity or create new burdens
Use	Uneven country ownership, differentiated access barriers, variable NDA/DAE capacity	Formal access does not ensure substantive demand articulation, strategic use, or equitable ability to navigate readiness support	Country window, DAE window, Country Platforms, GCF Liaison Officer placement scheme, vulnerable country allocation	Whether countries and entities can articulate substantive demand and use RPSP strategically

[46] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, executive summary and paragraphs 18–19 and 40–41.

OPERATING CONDITION	SURFACE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN PRIOR EVIDENCE	DEEPER OPERATING CONDITION	READINESS 3.0 RESPONSE	WHAT REMAINS UNDER-EVIDENCED
Evidence	Weak outcome evidence, unclear contribution to pipeline and direct access	Readiness contribution is difficult to evidence because effects are indirect, sequenced, cumulative, and often dependent on other GCF modalities	Revised RRMF country-level outcome scalers, more streamlined indicators, standardised deliverables	Whether results systems can evidence quality, contribution, learning, and institutional change
Sustainability	Capacity gains vulnerable to turnover, consultant dependence, weak institutionalisation	Capacity support may remain attached to grants, individuals, or external providers rather than becoming embedded in institutional policy and processes	Longer-term (multi-year) windows and modalities, embedded support, medium-term planning	Whether capacity is retained and institutionalised beyond individual grants and personnel changes

Source: 2018 and 2023 IEU evaluations of the RPSP; Readiness Strategy 2024–2027; adjacent IEU evaluations; inception interviews.

4. Access, Use and Contribution to Impact Stories

Earlier RPSP evaluations identified recurring issues in how readiness support has been used and sustained. Country ownership was uneven, access barriers differed between countries and entities, and the capacity of NDAs and DAEs varied widely. The same evaluations found that capacity gains were often fragile, vulnerable to staff turnover, dependent on consultants, and weakly institutionalised. Two deeper operating conditions underlie these issues. First, formal access to RPSP support does not, by itself, ensure substantive demand articulation, strategic use, or an equitable ability to navigate the RPSP. Second, capacity support may remain attached to grants, individuals, or external providers rather than becoming embedded in institutional policy and processes.

The windows, platforms, placements and multi-year modalities described in Section 3 are the Readiness 3.0 response to both conditions (see Table 2). Early evidence shows these modalities widening access and strengthening institutional and policy foundations, with use varying across countries. The conversion of capacity into funded projects and its retention beyond individual grants and personnel changes are slower

to emerge, as would be expected for effects that are sequenced and cumulative, and with Readiness 3.0 operational only since mid-2025. The sections that follow therefore look for early signals of this later progression alongside the established gains.

Readiness 3.0: emergent patterns in access and use under USP-2

A wider entry for readiness support

The new RPSP modalities are widening access to readiness support. Eligibility has broadened through a dedicated DAE window, support is now provided through four-year country and entity envelopes, and funding is accompanied by new forms of support, including in-country Liaison Officer placements and a roster of pre-qualified delivery partners.[47] In widening access, these modalities build on a role the RPSP has long played as an entry point to the GCF. In Tanzania, Saint Lucia and Mauritania, among other countries, first engagement with the GCF came through the RPSP, ahead of any funded project.[48] Armenia's use of RPSP grants to build its DAEs' relationship with the GCF ahead of formal accreditation shows the programme being used deliberately as an entry point for direct access.[49] Viewed from an access perspective, Readiness 3.0 is therefore more expansive than earlier phases of the RPSP, and stakeholders largely recognise this. Secretariat and country-level actors interviewed for the TPR described it as clearer, better suited to country priorities and a long-overdue move away from the limitations of the old model.

Attention to country needs

Since the Secretariat created its four regional departments in September 2024, Secretariat and accredited entity interviewees report deliberate efforts to extend readiness to what the Secretariat terms "Fragile and Conflict Affected Settings". The Secretariat is also developing tailored programming guidance for these settings. Somalia, for example, now has a country-support proposal under review.[50] At the same time, LDCs and SIDS are less represented in the initial set of grants approved under Readiness 3.0. LDCs accounted for 27.5 per cent of grants under Readiness 2.0 but only 15.4 per cent of the first 26 grants approved under Readiness 3.0. The share of SIDS also fell from 27.5 to 19.2 per cent, while that of African States rose from

[47] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraphs 22–24; Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraph 31.
[48] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review of the Green Climate Fund: Country Visit Briefs* (Tanzania, Saint Lucia, Mauritania) (not published).
[49] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review: Review of previous IEU Evaluations and Related Case Studies* (not published).
[50] Green Climate Fund, Work programme of the Secretariat for 2026–2028 and administrative budget (adopted by decision B.43/10), paragraph 17; Independent Evaluation Unit, *Brief: Evidence from operationalization of Readiness 3.0 and liaison officer scheme*, version 2.0, annex I, data extracted 20 August 2026 (not published).

31.1 to 34.6 per cent.[51] Much of this decline reflects the composition of the first approvals. Sixteen of the 26 grants came through the DAE window, only one of which involved an LDC, whereas LDCs accounted for three of the ten country-window grants.[52] Interviewees describe NDAs as needing more guidance to lead proposal development under the new approach, with little movement in some countries until a delivery partner steps in. The 2023 evaluation anticipated this risk, finding that capacity challenges in developing readiness proposals hindered vulnerable countries, and recommended that the new strategy be oriented to their needs.[53] For LDCs, however, this may prove a temporary setback, since the pipeline looks quite different from the approvals to date. Of the 28 single-country proposals under review by the Secretariat in August 2026, 13 (46 per cent) came from LDCs, well above their 15.4 per cent share of approved grants. SIDS, by contrast, accounted for only three of these proposals (11 per cent), below even their 19.2 per cent share of approvals.[54] A further 116 requests had yet to be submitted at that point, and their composition is not reported, so it remains to be seen whether, and how quickly, this pipeline will translate into approvals. With the Readiness 3.0 pipeline still at a preliminary stage, firmer conclusions cannot yet be drawn with confidence.

Shifts in country programming approach

Country needs identification and prioritisation show real, if uneven, movement since the RPSP's redesign. In Brazil, an updated Country Programme process has given national actors a clearer understanding of which projects are appropriate for GCF support. In Tanzania, RPSP use has shifted from a legacy focus on the National Adaptation Plan toward country programming and platform-based prioritisation.

The current Strategy has introduced new convening and coordination mechanisms, most visibly Country Platforms, intended to bring national actors together around a shared set of climate investment priorities. As reported to the Board in October 2026, the GCF had approved readiness support for Country Platform initiatives in seven countries, with a further 16 under design.[55] The most advanced example is Brazil's platform, formally launched in 2025 and governed by a steering committee of four federal ministries, with RPSP support helping establish its institutional architecture. By contrast, more traditional coordination structures have shown uneven effectiveness, with some bodies still functioning reactively and reviewing

[51] Independent Evaluation Unit, *RPSP Synthesis 2026: Evidence Deck*, analysis by IEU Excellence Team, 24 August 2026, slide 9 (not published).
[52] IEU analysis of GCF readiness portfolio data, 11 November 2026 (not published). Figures refer to the first 26 grants approved under Readiness 3.0, up to 5 August 2026.
[53] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, recommendations 7.1 and 7.2.
[54] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Brief: Evidence from operationalization of Readiness 3.0 and liaison officer scheme*, version 2.0, annex I, data extracted 20 August 2026 (not published). Bangladesh and Nepal, both scheduled to graduate from LDC status in November 2026, are counted as LDCs. Excluding them, the LDC share would be 39 per cent.
[55] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraphs 7 and 84. The seven countries are Burundi, the Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ghana, Jamaica and Oman.

proposals only after they are developed, rather than proactively prioritising them. As country stakeholders become aware of GCF's growing interest in Country Platform-type mechanisms, this raises questions about the future role of the Country Programme. The 2025 IEU evaluation of the GCF's approach to country ownership found that some GCF staff regard Country Programmes as effectively being phased out as a tool, although they have not been formally discontinued.[56]

Support for country institutions

Country ownership holds up best where the NDA plays an active, hands-on coordination role, and less well where that role is passive or fragmented across institutions. Some improvement in NDA coordination has been reported since the GCF's regional structures were introduced. However, NDAs are still described as constrained in their oversight role and as struggling to track GCF-funded activity in their own country. Even where an NDA is well established within its host ministry, that position is not necessarily stable. In Ghana, for example, budget constraints forced the NDA's technical advisory committee to cut its meeting frequency from quarterly to twice yearly, with the committee itself linking this directly to fiscal pressure and requesting dedicated funding to restore its previous schedule. NDA staff are sometimes poorly matched to the work, being either too senior for hands-on programming or too junior to carry real authority. At the same time, turnover within national entities has eroded institutional memory. In some cases, the delivery-partner fee cap, which is unchanged under the current Strategy, has also left institutions unable to cover the real cost of delivery, forcing reliance on consultants. The Liaison Officer role has been welcomed for helping national authorities regain control over engagement that was previously handled elsewhere. Liaison Officers are, however, accountable in two directions, since they are embedded in and support their host NDA while formally reporting to a GCF Regional Manager.[57] This dual accountability has been described as a risk, as it is not always clear whose priorities the officer serves.

In some countries, national coordinating bodies are reported to act more as compliance checkpoints than knowledge brokers, so lessons learned in individual projects are seldom carried across to the rest of the country portfolio. National authorities are also described as lacking the institutional capacity to synthesise lessons across RPSP activities. This constraint is compounded by staff turnover, which the Secretariat's 2024 evaluation of the RPSP cited among the "structural reasons, such as the frequent turnover of government staff, including NDAs" that make building NDA capacity a challenge that "simply cannot be solved once and for all".[58] Demand for more structured knowledge-sharing nonetheless remains strong and

[56] Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to Country Ownership, Evaluation report No. 24, September 2025, paragraph 158.
[57] Green Climate Fund, Standard Terms of Reference for Green Climate Fund Placements, section V.
[58] Green Climate Fund, Evaluation of the Outcomes and Impact-Level Results of the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, October 2024, p. 40.

largely unmet. A similar gap is evident within the GCF, where the knowledge management function has been constrained by limited resources, including reported staffing reductions. The shortfall does not stem from the programme's design, since readiness grants carry a recommended allocation of 10 per cent for learning and knowledge management. On average, however, only 3 per cent of approved readiness budgets is allocated to it.[59] The Secretariat's Readiness Knowledge Bank is discussed in Section 3.

Support to DAEs

Across readiness cycles, the RPSP has sought to increase the number of accredited DAEs and strengthen their capacity to build national capacity and deepen country ownership. The TPR survey reveals that RPSP support for accreditation was reported as overwhelmingly helpful.[60] Case studies from the TPR and previous IEU evaluations found that DAEs successfully reached accreditation (or reaccreditation) in several countries, including Jamaica, Armenia, Côte d'Ivoire, Lao PDR, Mexico, Bhutan, Micronesia, and Saint Lucia. The extent to which this accreditation success is translating into funded projects depends on the conversion constraints discussed under Contribution to Impact below.

The DAE window is the current Strategy's targeted response to a longstanding gap at the entity level. DAEs make up almost two-thirds of accredited entities, yet as of mid-2025 they accounted for only around a fifth of GCF funding, including proposals presented to the Board at that time.[61] The USP-2 targets doubling the number of DAEs with approved funding proposals, and this modality is open to government, civil society, and private sector entities. The proposals approved under the DAE window of RPSP so far reflect this breadth. As of August 2026, they included private and commercial entities such as Ghana's Ecobank and Nepal's NIMB, as well as government-owned development banks and agencies, two regional development banks and two non-profit organisations, spanning Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, as of August 2026, open DAE-window requests had been waiting nearly three times as long as country-window requests for an initial decision (a median of 136 days against 48 days). Among grants already approved, however, DAE-window grants moved from submission to approval faster than country-window grants (a median of 5.8 months against 7.1 months).[62]

Contribution to Impact

At country level, readiness support has contributed most significantly to the institutional and policy foundations of climate finance, which is the clearest finding to emerge from the seven TPR country visits

[59] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – annual report on implementation 2024", 10 October 2025, paragraph 68.
[60] Independent Evaluation Unit, Third Performance Review: Accredited Entity Perception Survey (not published).
[61] Document GCF/B.42/Inf.09 titled "Status of the GCF Resources, Portfolio and Pipeline", 13 June 2025, paragraph 29 and figure 17.
[62] Independent Evaluation Unit, *RPSP Synthesis 2026: Evidence Deck*, analysis by IEU Excellence Team, 24 August 2026, slides 7 and 8 (not published).

and from interviews with GCF and partner stakeholders. These contributions have taken several forms, beginning with strengthening NDAs and national coordination mechanisms and, in some countries, creating or strengthening climate finance units through which governments now engage with the GCF and other actors. Readiness has also supported institution building and accreditation, helping national development banks and other entities, including those in the private sector, to prepare for and secure direct access. Beyond these institutional gains, it has underpinned national planning processes, including NAPs and sectoral strategies, and has supported the early development of project concepts. Taken together, these contributions help explain why interviewees from NDAs credit readiness with much of what their institutions are today. Stakeholders in several countries also describe it as foundational but not yet transformative.

Translating built capacity into secured financing, whether from the GCF or from other sources, has proved more difficult and less consistent. Among the seven countries visited, only one presents a documented, direct pathway from readiness support to an approved GCF project. In a second country, two approved projects can be traced to a Country Programme developed with readiness support, and several further readiness-supported concepts have progressed to project preparation under the PPF. Elsewhere, readiness-supported concept notes were either still in preparation or had stalled at the time of the visits. Against these country-level findings, evidence across the wider portfolio is more encouraging: LLM-assisted analysis found that one in five approved funding proposals (70 of 352), together accounting for USD 2.1 billion in GCF funding, explicitly trace their origins to readiness support.[63]

Several factors constrain the conversion of readiness capacity into secured financing, and the following were among those most frequently observed.

- Limited technical capacity in countries and entities to develop concept notes and funding proposals.
- Limited guidance on moving from concepts to bankable projects, which leads to reliance on consultants and the loss of proposal development skills once readiness support ends.
- Weak links between readiness outputs and investment pipelines, with national plans and strategies that do not yield investment concepts, and concepts that struggle to find an AE willing to sponsor them or to align with GCF priorities.
- The absence of any mechanism to carry technical support or institutional knowledge forward from readiness to project preparation under the PPF (see Section 3), compounded by staff turnover that erodes institutional memory at each step (see “Support for country institutions” above).

[63] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Third Performance Review: GCF TPR Quantitative Analyses* (post-February 2026 workshop version), slide 37 (not published). Portfolio as of 3 April 2026.

- Delays in national sign-off procedures and in GCF review, with projects taking three to five years from concept to approval, and, in one case, a dispute over implementation leadership that stalled an otherwise viable proposal.

Much of the evidence of readiness contributions remains anecdotal because earlier results systems tracked grants largely at the output level, and the available data were insufficient to assess outcomes or impacts at the portfolio level.[64] That anecdotal evidence, drawn from across readiness phases and largely predating Readiness 3.0, nonetheless points consistently to an instrumental role for readiness within the wider climate finance landscape. The TPR country visits record readiness supporting pipelines with other financiers, informing projects approved by other development partners and helping to build Country Platform pipelines, in one case with potential investment exceeding GCF financing. At the same time, interviewees consulted for the TPR describe readiness as strengthening their ability to engage multiple funds and to coordinate across financing sources.

5. DELIVERY AND OPERATIONALISATION

Read together, the 2018 and 2023 RPSP evaluations, the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, adjacent IEU evidence and inception interviews suggest that several recurring issues are better understood as persistent operating conditions than as isolated technical or procedural problems. Earlier RPSP evaluations identified a consistent set of challenges, including delays in approval and disbursement, transaction costs, unclear roles, uneven country ownership, weak outcome evidence and capacity gains that were both fragile and limited. The fact that these challenges have resurfaced across successive strategies and evaluation cycles, despite the reforms introduced at each stage, points to a deeper pattern. Many of the issues affecting RPSP performance are not discrete problems that a new procedure or template can resolve, but structural conditions rooted in institutional arrangements, capacities, incentives, relationships, and evidence systems that shape how RPSP support is implemented, used, evidenced, and sustained. This interpretation builds on, rather than replaces, the findings of the earlier evaluations, and it frames the discussion of delivery that follows.

In the case of delivery, previous evaluations repeatedly pointed to delays, procedural complexity, unclear roles and coordination burdens, and these problems share a common root in a deeper operating condition. Delivering readiness support depends on many systems, actors and processes working together predictably, from the Secretariat's approval and disbursement systems and its regional arrangements to the delivery

[64] Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, conclusion 6; Green Climate Fund, Evaluation of the Outcomes and Impact-Level Results of the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, October 2024, section 4.3.

partners and national institutions that implement grants, so a weakness at any point in this chain can slow or disrupt delivery as a whole. Readiness 3.0 seeks to address this through a broad set of measures, including revised objectives, guidance and templates, the GCF Partner Portal (GPP), the country and DAE windows, the Liaison Officer placement scheme, new Secretariat and regional arrangements, and a revised RRMF. With implementation still at an early stage, however, the evidence does not yet show whether these reforms are changing that underlying condition. Because the reforms also add new instruments, systems, and actors, it remains unclear whether, on balance, they reduce complexity or create new burdens.

As of 31 August 2026, 30 grants worth USD 47.2 million had been approved under Readiness 3.0, and proposal and logframe information has been compiled for these grants.[65] This provides a useful baseline, allowing the Synthesis to see what Readiness 3.0 is becoming in practice. However, it cannot yet show whether the underlying operating conditions have changed, and further evidence is needed to assess implementation, contribution, and sustainability over time.

Emerging findings point to significant shifts in how RPSP support is delivered under Readiness 3.0, driven partly by the programme's redesign and partly by broader institutional reforms. Since the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 was adopted, the Secretariat has been restructured, most notably through the creation of four regional departments in September 2024,[66] and the Board has since taken further decisions on the GCF's regional presence, including the selection of host cities for its regional offices.[67] As part of the 2024 restructuring, management of the RPSP has moved from the former Division of Country Programming (DCP) to a newly constituted RPSP team within the Department of Investment Services (DINVS). At the same time, country engagement functions have been decentralised to the regional departments. Taken together with the introduction of regional focal points, new operational procedures, the country and DAE windows, the GCF Liaison Officer scheme and a revised RRMF, these changes have created an implementation context substantially different from that of previous readiness cycles. Their effects on delivery are not yet known, although stakeholders are broadly optimistic that they will prove positive.

Although the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 was adopted through Board decision B.37/21 in October 2023 and came into effect in January 2024, its operationalisation has taken longer than planned. The new operational modalities were rolled out only from June 2025, some 20 months after adoption and more than a year after the 1 April 2024 date envisaged in the Strategy itself, with earlier procedures remaining in use

[65] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraph 2.
[66] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11, paragraph 30.
[67] Decisions B.44/14 and B.44/15, both titled "Regional presence", 28 March 2026. Decision B.44/14 adopts the configuration of the GCF's regional presence, and decision B.44/15 selects the host cities for its regional offices.

during the intervening transition period.[68] Operationalisation required a substantial body of work, including the preparation and publication of new and revised templates and systems, the finalisation of the revised RRMF, the launch of the Liaison Officer placement scheme and the new DAE window, the creation of a roster of pre-qualified delivery partners, and a series of regional dialogues with NDAs and DAEs.

The scale of this work, coupled with the restructuring of the Secretariat that began in 2024, contributed to the delay.[69] Although all of these systems are now operational, countries are still learning to use the new approaches. The Strategy itself envisaged the revised modalities becoming operational from 1 April 2024.[70] The resulting lag of more than a year echoes a finding of the 2023 RPSP evaluation, which identified a similar gap between the previous strategy and its operational tools and recommended that the tools for operationalising the new strategy be introduced in a time-bound and timely manner.[71]

Readiness guidance has itself become a source of operational confusion under Readiness 3.0. Rather than being consolidated in a single reference point, the different facets of the current Strategy, namely country support, DAE support, the Liaison Officer scheme and delivery-partner arrangements, are each documented separately, alongside a running series of information sessions and webinars, and this guidance has continued to change well after rollout. Initial guidance for the country and DAE windows was prepared in 2024,[72] but it has since been revised repeatedly, and the current versions of the country and DAE guides are dated June 2026, about a year after the new operational modalities were rolled out in June 2025 and more than two and a half years after the Strategy was adopted. Templates show the same pattern: the terms of reference for pre-qualified delivery partners, first issued in September 2024, were updated in November 2025 and again in June 2026, and the Country Outcome Logframe, first issued in September 2025, was updated in June 2026.[73] Rather than being settled before rollout began, guidance has therefore evolved alongside operational experience with the new modalities. A similar gap between rollout and complete direction is evident at the regional level, where at least one regional division operated without an overall country-engagement strategy well into the first year of rollout, with a more complete approach not expected for a further year. Overall, stakeholders describe the current Strategy's design as sound and locate the real difficulty in the mechanics of delivery.

[68] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraphs 5,10 and 49.
[69] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11, paragraph 72.
[70] Green Climate Fund, Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 (adopted by decision B.37/21), paragraph 30.
[71] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme,* Evaluation report No.16, September 2023, conclusion 7 and recommendation 5.1.
[72] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11, paragraph 18.
[73] Green Climate Fund, Pre-Qualified Delivery Partner Terms of Reference, Country Support Modality, version note (initial version 22 September 2024, updated 21 November 2025 and June 2026); Green Climate Fund, Country Outcome Logframe, version note (initial version 15 September 2025, updated June 2026).

The GCF Liaison Officer placement scheme, introduced under Readiness 3.0 to help countries build institutional capacity for effective and consistent engagement with the GCF, has seen early uptake.[74] NDAs and focal points can request the placement of a Liaison Officer within their own offices or in other relevant agencies to assist with interactions with the GCF Secretariat and with overall RPSP delivery, including country programming, medium-term planning of RPSP support, origination efforts for mainstream funding, oversight of readiness activities and climate investments, and monitoring and reporting. LDCs and SIDS benefit from a dedicated allocation of USD 320,000 over four years for such a position, while other countries can cover the cost through their main country support window.

By August 2026, countries had submitted a total of 96 requests for Liaison Officers since the scheme was launched, and 60 officers had been deployed.[75] While early feedback points to positive benefits, the scheme's longer-term impact cannot yet be assessed. Some concerns also remain about the continuity of support, since initial assignments are limited to a maximum of 180 working days spread over just under a year, but can be extended based on an annual performance evaluation, continued need, and available funding.[76] Early evidence nonetheless suggests that the scheme is fulfilling its intended role as the primary point of contact between the Secretariat and NDAs, and it points to an unintended benefit in the form of active, informal knowledge exchange among Liaison Officers across countries. Because the scheme gives preference to local experts, many officers are likely to remain within their national climate finance communities after their placements end, so this peer exchange may help build national capacity beyond the duration of individual contracts.[77]

RPSP approvals and disbursements were slow under Readiness 1.0 and Readiness 2.0, and they remain limited under Readiness 3.0. Of the legacy portfolio approved up to March 2024, USD 504.7 million, or 81 per cent of approved funding, has been disbursed.[78] The pace of disbursement has also picked up, with the Secretariat disbursing USD 85.5 million in 2025, including refunds, against an annual target of USD 70 million.[79] TPR case studies further point to slow delivery, with some stakeholders indicating that delays in approval and feedback have affected the rollout of planned activities. This is consistent with the 2023 evaluation, which found that grants managed through general grant agreements took an average of 161 days

[74] Green Climate Fund, "GCF Liaison Officer placement scheme", webpage, https://www.greenclimate.fund/access-funding/readiness-preparatory-support/gcf-liaison-officer (accessed 16 October 2026).
[75] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraph 3. Secretariat figures presented in October 2026 put the number of requests at 98 as of 1 October 2026, with 60 officers deployed, 19 of them in SIDS and 22 in LDCs.
[76] Green Climate Fund, Standard Terms of Reference for Green Climate Fund Placements, section V.
[77] Green Climate Fund, "GCF Liaison Officer placement scheme", webpage, https://www.greenclimate.fund/access-funding/readiness-preparatory-support/gcf-liaison-officer (accessed 19 October 2026); Green Climate Fund, Standard Terms of Reference for Green Climate Fund Placements, 30 October 2025.
[78] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraph 8 and table 2.
[79] Ibid., paragraph 45 and footnote 4.

to move from approval to a signed legal agreement under Readiness 1.0, and 156 days under Readiness 2.0, or about five months.[80] It is too soon to identify trends under Readiness 3.0, as only 30 grants had been approved under the country and DAE windows as of 31 August 2026, and only eight had received a disbursement by May 2026.[81]

6. Results and Impact Reporting Architecture

Earlier RPSP evaluations repeatedly found that outcome evidence was weak and that the RPSP's contribution to pipeline development and direct access was unclear.[82] Part of the explanation lies in the nature of readiness itself, whose effects build up indirectly over time and often depend on other GCF processes, from accreditation to the PPF and the review of funding proposals. The difficulty is also one of design, however, since legacy reporting tracked grants largely at the output level. As a result, it has been difficult to evidence and report the RPSP's contribution to change at the national systems level. Readiness 3.0 responds with a revised RRMF that adds a country-level outcome scaler and standardised deliverables to a much shorter set of indicators. These changes bring measurement closer to what readiness is meant to achieve, but they carry their own risks. Outcome scores are self-rated by NDAs, and deliverables are standardised and linked to payment milestones, so the system may still reward what is easiest to document over the slower institutional change it is meant to capture. This Synthesis will examine whether the revised framework resolves this tension or reproduces it in a new form.

The revised RRMF is designed to move away from earlier results frameworks, under which reporting was largely activity-based and focused on inputs, grant milestones and outputs. It now aligns the results structure with the three objectives and eight outcomes of the Readiness Strategy. It also reduces the number of indicators from 95 to 23, with outcome indicators reduced from 24 to 9 and output indicators from 71 to 14.[83]

It also introduces a Country Outcome Logframe, which countries use to assess their readiness at the outset and to plan the pathway and readiness support they need over the medium term. For each of the nine outcome indicators, the country sets a baseline and a target, and seven of these indicators are rated on a

[80] Independent Evaluation Unit, *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme*, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, paragraph 312.
[81] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14 titled "Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme and Project Preparation Facility – Annual report on implementation 2025", 6 October 2026, paragraph 11.
[82] Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, conclusion 6; Green Climate Fund, Evaluation of the Outcomes and Impact-Level Results of the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, October 2024, section 4.3.
[83] Green Climate Fund, Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook, June 2026, section I and table 1; Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11, paragraph 32.

four-point scale.[84] Every readiness proposal, whether submitted through the country or the DAE window, must now include a theory of change and an output-level logframe aligned with the Country Outcome Logframe, and its deliverables are expected to fall under one of 14 standardised categories. These requirements are combined with annual reporting, led by the NDA at outcome level and by the entities delivering each grant at output level.[85] Taken together, they are intended to allow readiness results to be reported for the country as a whole rather than grant by grant, and so to capture change across a country's RPSP portfolio more fully.

The Secretariat's 2024 annual report presented results from legacy grants by mapping them onto the revised indicators,[86] but no outcome-level reporting from grants designed under the revised RRMF is yet available.[87] The brief therefore cannot yet assess whether these design features are improving results management in practice, a question the Synthesis will examine further in its final report.

7. Lessons from Adjacent Readiness and Capacity Building Initiatives

Both the 2018 and 2023 RPSP evaluations recognised that readiness support operates in a crowded climate finance ecosystem. The 2018 evaluation noted the multiplicity of readiness initiatives and the common delivery partners shared across readiness programmes, both within and beyond the GCF, while the 2023 evaluation used a systems lens to consider the RPSP in relation to other readiness programmes and wider climate finance systems. A key comparative observation from these evaluations was the RPSP's unusual scale and scope compared with other readiness programmes.[88] This brief uses comparators not to benchmark the RPSP comprehensively, but to identify selected lessons that may clarify design choices around accompaniment, meaning sustained, hands-on support that helps countries and entities navigate climate finance processes in practice, as well as around direct access, pipeline development, country coordination and learning. These lessons are used selectively and interpretively, recognising that the RPSP's mandate, scale and institutional location within the GCF make direct comparison with other initiatives

[84] Green Climate Fund, Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook, June 2026, section II and annex 1. Scaler indicators are qualitative indicators with a pre-defined range of performance, on which the country selects the level that best represents its current situation, ranging from 0 (no interventions) through 1 (formative conditions) and 2 (operational functionality) to 3 (advanced functionality). The remaining two outcome indicators, 1.3.1 and 2.2.1, take numerical values.
[85] Ibid., sections II and III; Green Climate Fund, Guidance on Standardized Readiness Deliverables, June 2026.
[86] Document GCF/B.43/Inf.11, paragraphs 35–36.
[87] Document GCF/B.46/Inf.14, paragraphs 10 and 100.
[88] The 2018 evaluation benchmarked the RPSP against the readiness activities of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF), the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), finding its design broader and more ambitious than those of the comparator funds. The 2023 evaluation also considered, among others, the Landscape Resilience Fund, the Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub and the USAID Climate Readiness Project. See Independent Evaluation Unit, Evaluation Report No. 1, October 2018, executive summary, and Independent Evaluation Unit, Evaluation report No. 16, September 2023, paragraph 131.

imperfect. The section draws on evaluative evidence from three comparators, the Adaptation Fund (AF) Readiness Programme, the Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub and the NDC Partnership, and concludes with a summary table of comparative lessons.

The Adaptation Fund Readiness Programme Final Evaluation (2026): This evaluation reinforces that accreditation is not the endpoint of direct access support, since entities often still need help after accreditation to turn their new status into funded projects. While it found some evidence that readiness support strengthened technical capacities relevant to direct access, it also found that this support did not consistently lead to accreditation or to successful access to project funding, and that the inclusion of key groups varied. It further identified a possible "pipeline problem" in the transition from readiness to substantial project funding.[89] For the RPSP, this is directly relevant to the DAE window under Readiness 3.0, which treats direct access as a continuing capacity pathway rather than a one-off accreditation milestone. Under this modality, accredited DAEs may access support over a four-year period, in coordination with NDAs and in line with country priorities, to meet any outstanding accreditation conditions and to strengthen the systems they need for programming and project implementation, from safeguards and procurement to monitoring and reporting.[90] The common lesson is that direct access requires support that helps entities make effective use of accreditation, both to originate viable projects and to manage them and sustain access to climate finance over time.

The AF evaluation also points to the importance of tailoring readiness support to institutional and country contexts. It finds that effective capacity building depends on understanding local institutional arrangements and how decisions are actually made, including the power dynamics behind them, and that generic guidance may be insufficient, particularly for LDCs and SIDS.[91] This is directly relevant to the differentiation agenda of Readiness 3.0, and especially to the question of whether the new modalities can respond to varied country and entity capacities rather than applying a uniform model of readiness support.

The Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub (CCFAH) Final Evaluation (2021): This evaluation provides a useful comparator because the Hub's model relies on embedded, in-country climate finance advisers rather than on grant support alone. The evaluation found the Hub to be highly relevant for small and vulnerable states, partly because it was seen as responsive to member needs and offered embedded technical assistance. Advisers helped identify sources of finance, guided countries on access requirements, developed concept notes, prepared successful funding proposals, and strengthened coordination, liaison and partnerships.[92] For the RPSP, this suggests that readiness support may need to move beyond discrete, short-

[89] Technical Evaluation Reference Group of the Adaptation Fund, Evaluation of the Adaptation Fund Readiness Programme, February 2026.
[90] Green Climate Fund, Guide on Strategic Planning of Readiness Support: Direct Access Entities, June 2026, section II.
[91] Technical Evaluation Reference Group of the Adaptation Fund, Evaluation of the Adaptation Fund Readiness Programme, February 2026.
[92] Commonwealth Secretariat, Evaluation of the Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub, Evaluation Series 120, February 2021.

term inputs towards sustained accompaniment that helps countries and entities navigate climate finance systems in practice.

At the same time, the CCFAH evaluation highlights the sustainability risks associated with embedded advisory models. It found that long-term capacity-building effects were inconclusive, that staff shortages and turnover reduced the effectiveness of "learning by doing", that exit and handover procedures were weak, and that knowledge management was insufficient to sustain benefits after advisers left. It also found that results systems risked under-recognising the broader capacity-building value of advisers when attention focused mainly on finance mobilised and pipeline figures.[93] The quarterly reports on activities and results that Liaison Officers are already required to share with the NDA and the Secretariat offer one possible starting point.[94]

NDC Partnership Mid-Term Review (2024): The review adds a useful comparator on country-led coordination. The Partnership operates through a country-driven, neutral-broker model, under which countries set the scope of their climate and development plans and the Partnership supports planning and implementation through a collective response among its members and partners.[95] The review found this approach highly relevant, because climate-related technical assistance, expertise, finance and other resources often exist but are not deployed in a coordinated way. For the RPSP, this is relevant to Country Platforms, Liaison Officers and medium-term programming, all of which are intended to organise demand and align support around country priorities. The link is also practical, since the revised RRMF cites the Partnership's best-practice brief on country coordination mechanisms, and the GCF's guide for countries points NDAs to the GCF and NDC Partnership climate investment planning and mobilisation framework.[96] The review also cautions, however, that coordination does not occur automatically. Global-level alignment did not always translate into country-level coordination; in-country facilitators were critical but sometimes overburdened, and finance mobilisation remained difficult where planning support was not connected to project preparation and investment pathways. Finally, the review found that results systems needed to move beyond reporting and accountability towards stronger use of data and evidence for continuous learning, a lesson directly relevant to the RPSP's results architecture under the revised RRMF.[97]

The three comparators reinforce a common lesson: readiness support is likely to be more useful when it moves beyond discrete capacity-building inputs toward sustained support for institutional pathways, coordination functions, proposal development, and learning. Table 3 summarises these insights.

[93] Ibid.
[94] Green Climate Fund, Standard Terms of Reference for Green Climate Fund Placements, section V.
[95] NDC Partnership, Independent Mid-Term Review of the NDC Partnership's 2021–2025 Work Program, January 2024.
[96] Green Climate Fund, Revised Readiness Results Management Framework: Handbook, June 2026, output indicator 1.1.2.1; Green Climate Fund, Guide on Strategic Planning of Readiness Support: Countries, June 2026, outcome 1.2.
[97] NDC Partnership, Independent Mid-Term Review, January 2024.

Table 3: Summary of select lessons

Comparator initiative	Most relevant lesson for RPSP	What the comparator suggests
Adaptation Fund Readiness Programme	Direct access requires more than accreditation	Direct access support needs to extend beyond accreditation to include project origination, proposal preparation, implementation capacity, safeguards, fiduciary systems, inclusion, and sustained institutional learning. The evaluation also points to a possible "pipeline problem" in moving from readiness support to substantial project funding.
Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub	Readiness may require accompaniment, not only grants	Embedded in-country advisers can help countries identify finance sources, develop concept notes and proposals, coordinate partners, and strengthen the wider climate finance ecosystem. However, sustainability depends on handover, knowledge management, institutional memory and capacity retention.
NDC Partnership	Country-led coordination is central to moving from plans to finance	Country-driven coordination models have governments articulate priorities and align partner support, but coordination does not happen automatically. In-country facilitation, partner alignment, project preparation, and learning systems are needed to move from plans to implementation and finance mobilisation.

These comparators do not offer models for the RPSP to replicate directly, given the differences in mandate, scale and institutional architecture. Rather, they highlight design considerations relevant to Readiness 3.0 and point to four distinct approaches, namely treating direct access as a pathway, accompaniment as a delivery function, country coordination as an operating condition, and learning as a core feature of readiness support.

8. Emerging Findings for Consideration

Emerging Finding 1: The RPSP has evolved from a broad readiness support facility towards a more structured instrument for enabling access to climate finance.

In its early phases, the RPSP operated largely as a facility for NDA strengthening, accreditation support, country programming and adaptation planning. It has since taken on a more defined role in helping countries and entities gain access to climate finance. Across all three phases of the programme, from its establishment in 2014 to the current Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, the evidence reviewed for this brief shows the RPSP to have remained well aligned with country needs and central to the GCF's offer to developing countries. However, its orientation has changed as the GCF itself has evolved. For much of the programme's history, it was not settled whether the RPSP was preparing countries for GCF finance specifically or for climate finance more broadly. The current design embraces both purposes, and the revised RRMF reflects this by tracking funding proposals submitted to other climate funds as well as to the GCF (see Section 3). The revised RRMF also addresses a question the GCF has long grappled with, namely, how to tell when a country is ready. Its Country Outcome Logframe rates most dimensions of a country's readiness on a scale from 0 to 3, although this approach has yet to be tested in practice (see Section 6).

These are important design improvements, but the RPSP's success will ultimately be measured by its results, and two tests matter most. The first test is whether countries and entities can turn readiness support into institutional capacity that outlasts individual grants and withstands staff turnover. The second test is whether that capacity then changes how countries access and direct climate finance, from the GCF and from other sources. Approved funding proposals are the most visible sign of this, but not the only one, since the value of readiness may equally lie in national systems that continue to plan and channel climate finance long after readiness support ends. Evidence to date shows that readiness is stronger at building capacity than at sustaining it over time or turning it into secured climate finance. The value of Readiness 3.0 will therefore rest on whether it can close that gap, so that the capacity it builds is retained by national institutions and shapes how countries secure and use climate finance.

Emerging Finding 2: The issues that recur across RPSP phases are structural operating conditions, not technical problems that can be fixed in isolation.

Across successive RPSP phases, the same issues have resurfaced despite the reforms introduced at each stage. Delays and procedural complexity in delivering support have persisted, as have uneven country ownership and access barriers that differ between countries and entities. Evidence of outcomes, and of the RPSP's contribution to pipelines, has also remained weak. Capacity built through the RPSP has often not

been embedded in national institutions and has been lost through staff turnover or once the support ends. The persistence of these issues through successive reforms points to structural operating conditions rather than technical problems. Such conditions are rooted less in the GCF's procedures, which have been revised repeatedly, than in the institutional arrangements, capacities, incentives and relationships within which readiness support operates, and in the evidence systems used to track it. Taken together, these factors shape how well the support is delivered and used, and whether its results can be demonstrated and sustained.

For the GCF, the practical implication is that new templates, guidance, modalities and reporting requirements can improve specific processes but are unlikely to change the conditions that have historically shaped the RPSP's performance. Those conditions will shift only if the underlying institutional arrangements and incentives change too, for example, in how NDAs are resourced to lead readiness and how much capacity GCF commits to its own knowledge and results functions. Readiness 3.0 has introduced substantial reforms, whose success will depend on addressing these structural conditions as well as the procedures through which support is delivered. The same test will apply to the next Readiness Strategy.

Emerging Finding 3: Readiness 3.0 is a significant design-level response to long-standing RPSP challenges, but evidence is not yet sufficient to show whether the underlying structural operating conditions are changing.

Readiness 3.0 narrows and reorganises the RPSP's objectives, establishes the country and DAE windows, increases the focus on direct access and pipeline development, differentiates support for vulnerable countries and introduces a revised RRMF. Together, these reforms mark a shift from readiness as a series of discrete grants towards a more structured and integrated instrument for country- and entity-led access to climate finance.

Evidence from the TPR country visits, gathered largely before Readiness 3.0 became operational, provides a baseline against which to judge these reforms. This evidence confirms the pattern described in Emerging Finding 1, with the RPSP contributing more clearly to strengthening national institutions and policies than to approved projects and climate finance. Much of the RPSP's wider contribution, including to finance beyond the GCF, is documented only anecdotally, because earlier results systems tracked grants largely at output level (see Section 4). The task for Readiness 3.0 is therefore twofold. Its longer-term modalities will need to help close the gap between these institutional gains and approved projects, while the revised RRMF will need to generate credible evidence of the RPSP's contribution. The first approved grants, along with their proposals and Country Outcome Logframe data, provide a useful early picture of how Readiness 3.0 is being translated into grant design. They do not yet allow an assessment, however, of whether delivery is becoming more predictable, whether countries and DAEs are using the RPSP more strategically, whether

pipeline contribution can be traced more credibly, or whether capacity is becoming embedded in national and local institutions.

Early evidence also raises questions about equity among particularly vulnerable countries. Only a small number of grants have so far been approved under Readiness 3.0. Compared with Readiness 2.0, however, LDCs and SIDS are less well represented in this pool of grants, while African States are better represented (see Section 4). The Board's aim of allocating at least 50 per cent of readiness support to particularly vulnerable countries treats LDCs, SIDS and African States as one group. Stronger representation of African States can therefore mask weaker representation of LDCs and SIDS. The pipeline of proposals under review in August 2026 presented a mixed picture. LDCs accounted for nearly half of these proposals, suggesting their representation may recover, but SIDS were even less represented in the pipeline than among approved grants. Representation within the group warrants close monitoring as Readiness 3.0 matures, especially for SIDS.

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